Ethiopiawinet 

1. A Coalition of unequal parties and objectives,

2. Has there been internal democracy in Kinijit ?

3. Our options for the way forward

A Coalition of unequal parties and objectives:
Kinijit is a coalition of 4 parties: AEUP, the largest with some 1,200,000 members in urban and rural Ethiopia except Gambella and the Ogaden; UEDP-Medhin with some 30,000 members, mostly in Addis Ababa and other large towns; EDL and Kestedemena truly small with only a few thousand members, Kestedemena existing only since October 2004.

With free and fair competition, AEUP was well-poised to score a decisive victory in northern, southern and central Ethiopia, including Afar, whereas UEDP-Medhin had some hopes in some big cities, but the other two small ones had none. Nevertheless, AEUP's leadership, under Ato Hailu Shawel, had always desired to consolidate the opposition. Its first attempt was to form a loose Coalition, JADE, with Dr. Beyene's SEPDC and Dr. Merera's ONC early in 2003, but it failed due to the conference of UEDF. The second attempt was with UEDP-Medhin late in 2003, which also failed due to a lack of sincerity in Lidetu. Therefore, the emergence of Kestedemena under the leadership of Prof. Mesfin and others was a welcome development.

Hence, AEUP did not hesitate to form CUD with the tiny parties under absolutely equal conditions at all levels of leadership. What AEUP had hoped to gain was a united and democratic opposition that would think and work for victory in May 2005. However, being ambitious and inexperienced in political organization and management, Kestedemena had a different objective.

Kestedemena had little or no knowledge or prior experience of political party activities, but it had plans to provide leadership to the coalition in a Kestedemena political culture, and AEUP and UEDP-Medhin, on the other hand, had a lot more time-tested organizational and field experience, and confidence and determination to win if there is a free and fair election in May 2005.

These two groups had equal votes in all organs of CUD. The Kestedemena group, according to yenetsanet goh siked, carried all their doubts and misconceptions about the older parties with them right through the end of April 2007 when things became slightly clearer to them. Up until about the end of April, Dr. Berhanu's group [See Dr. Berhanu's own description of himself and his colleagues, P.226 ] was, presumably, out with a missionary zeal to change the old parties in the image of Kestedemena, a party that was only a few weeks old. This plan is presented on Page 226 as follows:

The organizational culture, the work ethic and the working styles of the old parties were completely different from those adopted by Kestedemena, and it was appreciated by Kestedemena that it would take a lot of effort and time to replace this old party culture (of AEUP and UEDP-Medhin) by the new one( from Kestedemena). Those of us in Kestedemena are self-confident and independent (firmly standing on our own two feet), each having his/her own personal values and beliefs and hence, all our decisions on any topic were reached after strong discussions and exchanges as equals.

That desire to transform the old member parties of CUD was also evident in several other parts of Dr. Berhanu's book (pp. 138-146, 156, 190, 196,227, 249-257, 283-288) where he repeatedly dismisses the entire pre-election opposition as weak, divided, lacking in self-confidence, unaware of their strengths, unprepared for the elections, and as incapable of effective political analysis of contemporary political issues; he also labels the opposition as visionless, disorganized and driven only by their opposition to EPRDF's brutality, and criticizes the opposition as suffering from inter-party rivalry, thereby giving up the election forum of May 2005 to EPRDF. Indeed, there were no political party attributes or opposition actions that were regarded positively by Dr. Berhanu as he came in for the first time into legal multi-party politics.

Hence, whereas Ato Hailu of AEUP and Dr. Admassu Gebeyehu of UEDP-Medhin had formed CUD and were seriously preparing to win elections, Dr. Berhanu was unimpressed by these "weak" parties ( See Pages 191 and 286 of his book, among several others) which he thought badly required his Kestedemena "...organizational culture, the work ethic and the working styles...".

That may partly explain why Dr. Berhanu has never ever seriously attempted to ensure a level playing field in the elections as the Chief of Kinijit's Political Campaign Committee; he has had a reasonable amount of time for that, with proper organization and effective division of responsibilities, between October 2004 and February 2005. The failure may also be due to the fact Dr,. Berhanu has had little or no idea about the necessity for free and fair elections since he has never felt the pain and suffering of millions all over the country in the previous elections in 1995 and 2000. Indeed, on Page 138 of his book, Dr. Berhanu had this to say:

Prior to the preparations for the elections in May 2005, I knew very little about the status
of political parties... In particular, there was not much that I knew about the internal operations of opposition parties(Page 138).

Nevertheless, Dr. Berhanu had the unbelievable wisdom to devote a large portion of his book to criticisms of the opposition, more emphasis on UEDF, AEUP and UEDP-Medhin.

Equally bad is the misconception of the objective reality as depicted on Page 145, in the Section which enquires why there are no strong opposition political parties; it reads as follows:

The fact is that those in the opposition camp that are of any significance at all are only ethnic parties, and hence, given their similarity with the ruling party, the issue of "who is to be in power" has looked like a mere struggle for naked power."

This also clearly demonstrates a glaring deficit in Dr. Berhanu's knowledge of the then multi-party opposition, including AEUP and UEDP-Medhin. Even embassies in Addis Ababa knew that AEUP was a political force to reckon with in the upcoming elections, but Dr. Berhanu knew so little about it that he dismissed it outright as inconsequential when compared to ethnic parties. It was this ill-informed Kestedemena and its leader that were a very vocal critic in CUD, determined to remold AEUP and UEDP-Medhin in its own image, and not ready to learn from them and then move on together to make effective joint preparations for election victory.

Hence, the perception of Kestedemena, as explained by Dr. Berhanu, was that Kinijit was weak [pp. 286, 308-311], and disorganized [p. 191], and that it would lose the elections. Hence, dreams of the old coalition partners and that of Dr. Berhanu were far from similar during the early days of CUD. One wonders why he joined such a group that he regarded weak and worthless !

The baseless attitude that Kinijit will lose the elections in May 2005 was reported to have been shared by all member parties, except AEUP, as reflected on Page 286 of Yenetsanet Goh siked where there is also this strange question below, posed immediately after Ato Hailu's presentation to the Kinijt leadership of a victory prediction of over 350 parliamentary seats  (against only 86 by Lidetu) if free and fair elections prevail.

Dr. Berhanu's strange question reads as follows:
"How is it that any party can be so confident of victory as it goes into an election?...It is improper to go into an election holding the conviction that it will have victory."(Page 286).

Dr. Berhanu appears to have believed that it is better to go into an election with a conviction of losing, and not victory. This was a strange idea to entertain by Kinijit's self-appointed Political Campaign Chief on the eve of the political campaign period in 2005. It was a perception that might have baffled AEUP in particular. Perhaps, Dr. Berhanu's hopes for victory were for 2010.

Further, instead of taking the well-considered opinion of Kinijit's seasoned leader who had built a weak AEUP in August 2003 into a formidable opposition party by October 2004, the Kinijit leadership, three-fourths of which come from the three small parties, decided as follows:

We decided that Kinjit can win a minimum of 100 seats and a maximum of 300 seats, and that we need to clearly identify the constituencies and work towards it.(Page 287).

This decision was reached by representatives of EDL and Kestedemena, comprising 50% of the committee and Lidetu and associates who always wanted to deceive themselves as a big party simply by belittling the strength of AEUP. The decision was made by those who knew very little about the strength of AEUP and those who intentionally collaborated with the ill-informed for purposes of denying recognition to AEUP.

Indeed, even the gap between 100 and 300 seats was ridiculously large. Here, one should give tremendous credit to Ato Hailu for bearing with such deliberations and decisions and still continuing to work with the group right to the end.

The decision also clearly shows not only the ignorance of some and the destructiveness of others, but also the lack of overall capacity to appreciate the leadership qualities and achievements of Ato Hailu as Chairman of AEUP. This is not surprising since our elite rarely give credit when it is due.

This uninformed, but " I know all ", approach is an old chronic disease that we have seen with EPRP and MEISON in the 1960s and 1970s and again with Derg, and currently with EPRDF where all of these forces have claimed to be all-knowing and have gone out to destroy their own rich heritage to start all over again. As Prof. Mesfin once wrote in December 1983 in response to a Derg cadre who had forcefully argued against press freedom in WEP's Meskerem, the acts of all these groups, including that of Dr. Berhanu, can be explained by Prof. Mesfin's "denkoro defar neuw !"

The television debates then came on, and a few towns close to Addis Ababa were also visited by Dr. Berhanu and others, but rural Ethiopia was not accessible to either the television debates or the few visits by the few urban elite in CUD. However, the previous party structures and organizations of the older, but misunderstood parties, still continued to work in rural Ethiopia in spite of the remoteness from television debates. Then Kestedemena's leader saw a "miracle" for the first time.

As we received reports from our field representatives and as we also observed during our own field campaigns, we came to be convinced that, contrary to our previous estimates, either Kinijit or the entire opposition will win the election. (See page 287)

That was effectively what Ato Hailu had told the Kinijit Executive Committee (See p. 286) much earlier, along with the necessity of convincing strong and independent international and local election observers to be fielded in rural constituencies to ensure free and fair elections, but Dr. Berhanu, the Election Campaign Chief of Kinijit, and his associates did not believe their leader ( See p. 286) and, hence, did not make the highly critical effort to seriously follow up on Ato Hailu's suggestions. They had the old egocentric habit of listening only to themselves ! The cost of that negligence to CUD and to Ethiopia on May 15, 2005 and thereafter was incalculable !

Dr. Berhanu also tells us ( P.345) that on the eve of the elections on May 15, 2005, there was a great feeling of solidarity within the entire party structure, both in the Head Office and in the regions. Such a feeling is very unlikely in the absence of internal democracy within the Kinijit leadership. It also says a lot for Ato Hailu's effective leadership qualities, in spite of having to continuously contend with individuals like Dr. Berhanu that looked down upon AEUP and the great achievements of this party since 2003.

Has there been internal democracy in Kinijit ?
On Page 222 of Yenetsant goh siked, it was stated that Ato Hailu had been elected as the first Chairman, effective from Tikmit 1997 for six months, to be followed by one of the other three chairmen of the member parties of Kinijit for another six months, and the rotation would then go on every six months. Clearly, the whole idea of a rotation smelled like that of the rotation of Beyene-Merera-Fassika of 2003 in UEDF. Hence, the next chairman is due in April 2005, another crazy possibility. A party like Kinijit needs the best possible leader to help us win over the current brutal dictatorship and minimize the loss and destruction of our Ethiopian heritage. This is not yegiorgis mahiber weyim yedebir senbetie weyim equib ! This is a much more serious and national affair !

While still discussing the formation of CUD, some members of the coalition, probably Lidetu and associates, had tried to smear Ato Hailu as being one who used a business management style in party management, tolerated no differences, was too strong-headed, and was not careful in delivering public speeches.

In order to find the truth of those allegations against Ato Hailu, Dr. Berhanu and his associates had apparently done some investigation of their own to collect information about Ato Hailu's character and management style from members of the AEUP leadership in the Coalition in preparation for the selection of a leader for Kiniit. Hereunder is what Dr. Berhanu was reportedly told ( P. 221) by Ato Hailu's colleagues in the AEUP leadership:

The criticisms of Ato Hailu's party management style are true. He also has strong and positive attributes; he had raised AEUP from the dust and built it into a strong national party in a very short time; he had expanded the areas of AEUP's presence from one limited to a few Amhara zones to the entire country( perhaps with the exception of Gambella and Somali regions) largely because of his management style; that even his being accused of being strong-headed is not true since he can accept other points of view if they are well-argued, and that he has had no problems admitting that he has been wrong, and then taking corrective steps; he will have no problem working smoothly with reasonable and strong persons in the Executive Committee; they would, therefore, recommend Ato Hailu as chairman of Kinijit in order to advance the cause of Kinijit without any risk of partisanship.

This is also the Hailu Shawel that has been described to me by a respectable member of AEUP's Executive Committee. These qualities of Ato Hailu are also borne out by the effective leadership given to Kinijit from October 2004 to October 2005 in spite of the fact that Kinijit's Executive Committee had quite a number of strong-headed members like Dr. Berhanu and his associates, on one hand, which looked down upon the old parties in Kinijit and worked to remold them in their image, and Lidetu and his divisive associates, on the other, continuously plotting to destroy Kinijit.

Nevertheless, Dr. Berhanu tells us ( P.345) that on the eve of the elections on May 15, 2005, there was a feeling of solidarity within the party structure, both in the Head Office and in the regions. That says a lot for the existence of internal democracy and for Ato Hailu's leadership qualities.

Hence, Kinjit was a strong and united party at the time of the elections and there were no complaints on lack of internal democracy. After the elections, and before Sene 1, 1997, Berhanu had this to say ( See p. 368) about the process of decision-making within Kinijit:

Before giving an example, let me first give an overall description of the discussion and decision procedure of Kinijit's Executive Committee. Those who do not know about Kinijit's decision-making procedure regard Kinijit to be dominated by a few individuals ( especially the Kinjit Chairman, Ato Hailu). As far as I know, the motion that wins in any meeting of the Kinijit Executive is the one which is argued better. As a result, those ideas that arise at the beginning of the meeting are either different or considerably modified versions at the time of the decision. Many members change their views during the discussions; this, in my view, is a healthy development. The role of the Chairman is to chair the meeting and also present his views like any other member of the Executive Committee. Sometimes, Engineer Hailu forgets that he is the Chairman and takes a lot of time in the debate. When this happens, we have admonished him by saying " You cannot do this; you are giving too much time to yourself; chair the meeting properly". Very often, he corrects the problem right away. Sometimes he becomes angry, but we do not let him go because he is "angry". I remember one occasion when there was a hot debate in the Executive Committee when Ato Hailu dominated the debate to such a degree that he forgot his role as chairman even when members raised their hands to be given permission to talk. Even worse, he would give a chance for a member to talk, and he would then come back to explain his own point of view if the member had presented views that were different from his. At that point, many got frustrated and raised a point of order. Two members then advised him that he was giving too much time to himself and that others were being ignored and that it would, therefore, be better for him to leave the chair to the 1st. Vice-Chairman and join the debate from the floor. Ato Hailu was so irritated that he picked up his bag, told us " I am now leaving the chairmanship for you !" and was on his way out when even his supporters stood against his decision, and agreed that the point of order was right, and that he would have to choose between the two roles. When he had cooled down, he agreed that he was wrong and began to chair the meeting again.

In all meetings of Kinijit's leadership, there has been no occasion when decisions have been taken without good cause just because of modesty, respect or fear of any individual. "(See pages 368-369 of Br. Berhanu's book).

After Sene 1, 1997, there was absolutely no reason to believe that any one individual would be dominant in the Kinijit leadership and that the procedure described in so great detail above by Dr. Berhanu would suddenly fall apart. Further, while in prison for 20 months, the Kinijit leadership had no chance to meet as a group, and no decisions could be made as a group, thereby leaving any decisions to Kinijit's Chairman.

Hence, since Kinijit's meetings were impossible in prison and since those of the group of 22, representing a CC of 60, in September 2007 are illegal, Dr. Berhanu's recent claim on VOA on 22/10/2007 that the cause of the current conflict is the lack of respect for the decisions of Kinijit, and hence a violation of internal democracy, by Ato Hailu does not make sense since no such decisions were made by Kinijit's leadership either at the level of its CC or its Executive Committee.

The alleged decision of Ato Hailu to support KIC can easily by debated in Kinijit's CC and reversed, if necessary, instead of using it as an excuse to create chaos within Kinijit, to abandon the urgent and official recognition of Kinijit and to then go on a purposeless global tour.

In short, as Dr. Berhanu himself has so vividly explained in the quotation given above, there was no lack of internal democracy; hence, the conflict within the leadership of Kinijit is not due to lack of internal democracy ! His complaint of 22/10/2007 on VOA is an excuse for a power struggle. Dr. Berhanu and his associates have decided to present their plea for support to Kinijit support groups in the Diaspora and have resorted to the highly indefensible and undemocratic procedure of calling a meeting of 22 CC members released from prison, deciding to abandon the urgent task of seeking Kinijit's official recognition and leave on a meaningless global tour under the lame prestxt of raising funds ( for whom ?) and solving the problem related to KIC and KIL while the leadership itself is highly divided and helpless, and Kinijit itself is non-existent. Let me next examine our options as a supporter of Kinijit.

What are our options for the way forward ?
In his interview first with Voice of Germany and then with the Amharic Service of the Voice of America on 16/10/2007, Prof. Mesfin told us the truth: the current problem in Kinijit's leadership is a power struggle. My own investigations using the book, yenetsanet goh siked, clearly confirms that Dr. Berhanu himself has never ever complained anywhere in his book against Ato hailu's violation of decisions of the Executive Committee or those of its CC. On the other contrary, the detailed quotation from p. 368 of his book, as given above, clearly shows that there can be no such problems of violations by Kinijit's Chairman.

What Dr. Berhanu appears to have done is to use an undemocratic procedure - using a decision of a group of 22 - to abandon the urgent legalization of Kinijit to go on a globe trotting mission to present his case to support groups in the Diaspora, collect some money, and obtain some help to enable him to take over the Kinijit leadership by bewitching them with nice words and promises. Fortunately or unfortunately, our compatriots in the Diaspora have no capacity to make or unmake the leadership of Kinijit; that capacity is the sovereign right of those at home who have died, bled and suffered under the yoke of the current brutal dictatorship.

People in the Diaspora and at home may have problems in figuring out what type of leadership Kinijit wants at this time. Judging from the noise and clamor in some websites, the choice of a leader for Kinijit appears to be between Dr. Berhanu and Ato Hailu Shawel. For those who get easily carried away by sweet speeches, as they have always done with Lidetu, the choice may be easy; Lidetu will be their best choice since they want to deceive themselves and be deceived, Lidetu being peerless at that. Good speeches alone have never delivered the goods even in UEDP-Medhin which was always a tiny party compared to AEUP !

So, let me make some suggestions for a reasonable choice at this time. Let us look at Ato Hailu and Dr. Berhanu very closely and weigh them against their past performances and promises. Let me first suggest what I want from a Kinijit leader:

*He must be a person with diversified and proven organizational and management experience, including one in a political party.

*He must be a successful leader of a strong party in order to ensure that Kinijit will continue to have a wide political base.

*He must have a good performance record of leadership in Kinijit itself.

*He must have no background that is antagonistic to other opposition party leaders who must be eventually mobilized to form a still larger coalition against EPRDF.

*He must be regarded as a credible leader by both party supporters at home and abroad, and by external forces.

*He must be a leader who has unconditional respect for internal democracy.

*He must be committed fully to the Kinijit cause.

*He must be careful with his choice of words so as not to antagonize anybody or group, including foreign powers.

A leader who has the above qualities will surely lead us to a united and democratic Motherland, in close collaboration with all other opposition forces. Let us now look at Ato Hailu Shawel, the current Chairman of Kinijit, and Dr. Berhanu Negga against these criteria. First is Dr. Berhanu.

Dr. Berhanu Nega:
I must admit that Dr. Berhanu is a good speaker, just like Ato Lidetu; both him and Ato Lidetu have come to the forefront of the Ethiopian political arena through the strong support of Prof. Mesfin. However, the three are clearly a different breed since the two are overly ambitious whereas Prof. Mesfin is not. In other respects, Dr. Berhanu still lacks a lot according to the above criteria. His young age is not necessarily an asset either and his performance in Kinijit has been poor. Ethiopia has also had bad times under young and self-centered elites since 1974. It is time to mix them up to represent the realistic hopes and aspirations of Ethiopian society !

Dr. Berhanu came into multi-party politics in October 2004. Hence, he has a very negligible experience in political party organization and management. The short period of his leadership in Kestedemena has been marred by the withdrawal of Prof. Mesfin and Ato Bedru Adem from his party, presumably because of his inability to provide democratic leadership.

His record of leadership has included the key position of Political Campaign Chief of Kinijit, at his own insistence, and Head of the Kinijit negotiating team that led to the appointment of conflict resolution panels that ended up being organized and managed by EPRDF. As for his chairmanship of the Political Campaign Committee, that was also pretty bad since he did not even organize sensibly: he had three sub-committees - one for the mass media, another for the production of documents, and a third for the debate and conference forums. He had none for collecting information from election constituencies and that cost Kinijit dearly since Kinijit failed to substantiate its case in many investigation panels which Dr. Berhanu had accepted, fully aware that they were all partisan. His stand to belittle the candidacy of those with low education (p. 237) from rural Ethiopia is not only too elitist and unrealistic, it also appears to say that only the educated elite have a right to be in parliament, and speak for the great majority in rural Ethiopia. That is a dumb strategy in today's Ethiopia where the educated elite are responsible for the entire mess we have had since 1974 !

Indeed, he also admits ( p. 311) that the system for collecting information was all disorganized badly (p. 311), and it has been all his fault. In addition, he has also failed to do the necessary lobbying with international observers to send their observers to rural Ethiopia to stop EPRDF from ballot rigging or stealing the entire ballot box, as proposed early by Chairman Hailu Shawel. In short, his record in Kinijit or even within Kestedemena has not been passable.

His relations with other political leaders has been largely antagonistic, starting with Prof. Mesfin (See pp. 192, 203,226), Drs. Beyene and Merera (See Pages 247-258) where he has some hard words for both Beyene and Merera, for the Chairman of EDL who is described as soft, and Chairman Hailu who is presented ( see p. 220) as a candidate for chairmanship only because of his age and his strong party, and the latter oblique suggestion that Ato Hailu cannot deliver a message (see p. 343) in the mass media, which is not true. Again, Dr. Berhanu has such a confrontational approach with other leaders that he is unfit to lead Kinijit and mobilize collaborators.

His respect for internal democracy is also highly suspect when one sees his role in the meeting of the group of 22, his self-nomination for the Chairmanship of the Political Campaign Committee (pp.223, 226), his unauthorized cancellation of the Kinijit pre-conditions for negotiations with Bereket, his unauthorized submission of a Transitional Government of Unity proposal to the Prime Minister without the knowledge of the Kinijit leadership and his unauthorized statement that Kinijit would join parliament during his post-election tours in London and Washington, D.C., among several others. An example of still another high-handed role in Kinijit related to the distribution of funds from the Diaspora ( see p. 246) which had run into a problem when support groups in the Diaspora were preparing to send the funds to each of the member parties of Kinijit. Being everywhere and anywhere, Dr. Berhanu apparently found that out and this was what he said he did:

I called the Committee chairman in the Diaspora by phone and told him all the funds should be sent to Kinijit's account. When he told me that the decision was made by the parties themselves, I asked him to tell me who did that. He could not give me an answer. Hence, I called a meeting of all party chairmen immediately and asked them about any such decisions by them. They told me they did not know about it. Hence, a letter was prepared at that meeting, it was signed by all four chairmen, and was faxed to the committee chairman in the Diaspora right away ( p. 246).

This was clearly a speedy resolution of the problem. However, it was not Dr. Berhanu's job but that of Dr. Befekadu, the Chairman of the Finance Committee. Further, he had no right to call a meeting of the three other party chairmen, which constituted a quorum for the Executive Committee meeting; Ato Hailu should have chaired that; internal democracy can be ignored if it suits him.

If internal democracy had any value for Dr. Berhanu, what he should have done is to inform Kinijit's Chairman or Dr. Befekadu about the problem, urging speedy action, and not take things into his own hands, thereby stepping on people's toes. That was not internal democracy in action. However, I appreciate the tolerance of Ato Hailu Shawel, the other party leaders and Dr. Befekadu for ignoring the procedural error and continuing to serve Kinjit in spite of such interference.

Dr. Berhanu is also suspect on the criterion of commitment to Kinijit since he regularly meets (see, for example, pp. 301, 343) with Ato Bereket and other senior EPRDF cadres without Kinijit's authorization. Such meetings, especially those with Bereket and the Prime Minister, have seriously compromised the position of Kiniit. Indeed, a leader of Kinijit cannot handle Kinijit's sensitive affairs during the day, and hung out with Bereket during the evening.

Last comes the criterion of careful delivery of public speeches and interviews with the press. Dr. Berhanu accuses ( p.369) Ato Hailu of an angry reaction to the Sheik's open partisanship during the period of the political campaign. However, he fails to mentions his own slip of the tongue during a television debate when Ato Bereket coaxed him to make a senseless anti-American statement against the violation of Ethiopian sovereignty when EPRDF allowed the over-flying of American fighter jets going to Iraq over Ethiopian airspace. That statement was not only out of line with Kinijit's policy but also highly damaging to Kinijit's relations with the US Embassy and the US Government. His statement to Kinijit supporters that Kinijit would join parliament in his official pot-election tour in London and Washington, D.C., his cancellation of the pre-conditions in the post-election negotiations with NEBE and with Bereket, and his unauthorized response to the Prime Minister's telephone call and his subsequent proposal of a Transitional Government to him without Kinijit's authorization were all in violation of Kinijit's leadership codes. However, Dr. Berhanu belabors the relatively harmless remarks of Ato Hailu about the Sheik (p.369).

Ato Hailu Shawel:
As President of AEUP, he has transformed it from a weak party in July 2003 to the strongest opposition party by October 2004. Indeed, the strong political base of Kinijit in rural Ethiopia is the making of Ato Hailu's able leadership. His ability to hold such a potentially warring group as the member parties of Kinijit together throughout the period from November 2004 to October 2005 is, by itself, a tremendous achievement. Dr. Berhanu's book presents no indications of serious upheavals or in-fighting during this one-year period.

As for credibility, AEUP's leader has definitely been very credible, and that is evidenced by the rapid expansion of AEUP into all regions of Ethiopia, except the Ogaden, and the many frequent visits of the diplomatic corps to AEUP's Head Office. An indication of such recognition is a business-lunch initiated and organized by the American Ambassador in 2003 when Ato Hailu went to the lunch with two members of the Executive Committee of AEUP.

After everybody got seated, the Ambassador reportedly turned to Ato Hailu and asked him about AEUP's policy towards Eritrea. Ato Hailu's immediate response was : "Eritrea is a sovereign state; our concern is only for Ethiopia". She was surprised and the business session practically ended there and all other discussions were on topics of no political consequence. That also says a lot for Ato Hailu and AEUP even as far back as 2003.

His relations with the leaders of other opposition parties, like Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merera, has been cordial and AEUP, ONC and SEPDC had, in fact, formed a coalition called JADE in 2003. Even today, working with both of them, Ato Bulcha Demeksa of OFDM and others, both within and outside Ethiopia, is bound to be smooth since they all have mutual respect for one another. Hence, Ato Hailu is certainly in a much better position to initiate and promote the creation of a strong coalition of all opposition parties to advance the cause of the Nation's democratic struggle.

Ato Hailu's respect for internal democracy is confirmed even in Yenetsanet Goh Siked ( see p. 368) where all decisions were reported to be democratic. Indeed, Ato Hailu has even been tolerant when even his functions were grabbed by Dr. Berhanu ( See p. 246). His commitment to Kinijit is also unquestionable. He does not chair Kinijit during the day and go for drinks with EPRDF at night.

With regard to the delivery of public speeches, there is no instance, in his long leadership record, when he has antagonized an external power through a carelessly worded speech or interview. In fact, people close to him in the AEUP top leadership know him to be always sensitive to the niceties of diplomacy in all his dealings with the diplomatic corps and other visitors.

Concluding remarks:
Prof. Mesfin was absolutely right during his recent German and VOA interviews: the cause of the current internal conflict within the Kiniit leadership is power struggle, and that Yenetsanet goh siked is a book by Dr. Berhanu about Dr. Berhanu.

The book tells us about Dr. Berhanu's problems of haste and waste, his lack of informed judgment (e.g. his erroneous perception of the strengths of multi-ethnic parties and his refusal to accept the victory predictions of Ato Hailu under free and fair elections), his disregard for the principles of internal democracy when it suits him, his hostile descriptions of prominent political leaders ( Ato Hailu, Prof. Mesfin, Prof. Beyene, Dr. Merera, and Ato Chekol, but not Ato Bereket or Ato Meles) who are potential allies in the democratic struggle, and his utter incompetence (e.g. failure to ensure a level playing field, poor political campaign organization and management, his support for naïve and elitist criteria for candidacy in rural Ethiopia, and total failure in all negotiations) as Kinijit's Political Campaign Chief.

Dr. Berhanu has also shown himself to be incapable of setting up priorities since he has chosen to abandon both the issue of seeking urgent official recognition for Kinijit and the very people that were shot, beaten, imprisoned and maimed for Kinijit at home, going, instead, on a frivolous global tour. All in all, Dr. Berhanu lacks management and political experience, lacks the aptitude for organized and systematic leadership, lacks the temperament to mobilize the entire opposition for the democratic cause, lacks party discipline, and is too self-opinionated to be a good party organizer. Kinijit requires a more disciplined, calculating, widely experienced, knowledgeable, and compassionate leader at this time. That is what Yenetsanet goh siked tells us if we read carefully.

Hence, Ato Hailu Shawel is our best option for a strong and experienced leader, and he should continue as Chairman of Kinijit to build it, as he had done with AEUP in 15 months, into an invincible democratic political force before 2010, while mobilizing the entire opposition at home and abroad to move together towards victory in 2010 and a government of national unity for a peaceful, united and democratic Ethiopia.

To achieve this goal, all Kinijit support groups the world over must hold all funds collected with the participation of the self-appointed global missions on behalf of Kinijit until Kinijit is officially recognized, and that credible financial management and auditing procedures need to be urgently instituted to ensure the full transparency and accountability at all levels. That of KIL was a good start, but it was quite poor since a person should not collect, deposit and disburse funds.